Time for Action

Hidden Diplomacy

Afshar Soleimani

If the US does not lift the sanctions against Iran by 21st February 2021, which it will not, the Islamic Republic of Iran will suspend the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol by implementing a passage for its parliament. From that date forwards, Iran will only cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the framework of nuclear safeguarding and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If everything goes according to plan, the quantitative and qualitative level of the IAEA’s inspections of Iran’s nuclear activities will not be the same as in the years after the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and it seems that this measure will impose more limitations on Iran.
The steps that Iran has taken as a result of the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in the last year and a half, including uranium metal production, increasing the amount and percentage of uranium enrichment, and other measures, have been protested to by other JCPOA members and the US. In addition, the final step, which will be taken on 21st February,  could lead to greater US convergence with Europe, Russia and China on the Iranian nuclear issue. The continuation and deepening of such convergence could lead to further sanctions against Iran, the resumption of EU sanctions, and the possibility of referring Iran’s nuclear case to the Security Council, repeating the adoption of new resolutions against Iran.
Although Iran is insistent on the return of the US to the JCPOA and the lifting of sanctions due to the violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is a legitimate position, the truth is that the international system does not revolve around rights and justice, but around all-round power and competition. Continued tensions in the Iran nuclear case, between Tehran and other members of the agreement, and the insistence of Tehran and Washington in their announced policy to take the first step by the other side, will cause further freezing of this case, resulting in great losses for the region and the rest of the world. It goes without saying that the continuation of this impasse can have many side effects on the economic situation of Iran and the livelihood of the Iranian citizens.
Given the internal and external constraints of both countries in decision-making, the low cost and beneficial strategy is to use covert diplomacy at the beginning, as has been done in the past, and provide a platform for open diplomacy to continue on the next steps. In the form of covert diplomacy, the US and Iran can agree on reciprocal steps. Many plans are currently being proposed to break the deadlock of the JCPOA, including one which asks the US to consider exemptions for two or three oil-buying countries and provide a situation where Iran can receive the money of its oil exportation. Accordingly, with the start of oil sales and the receipt of money, Iran can return one of its actions on the nuclear issue to the conditions set out in the IAEA Board.
Based on this proposed plan, in the second step the US can provide facilities for Iran to receive its blocked money in different countries. In return, Tehran can reverse another of the steps taken. Meanwhile, accepting Iran’s request to receive a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could be another positive step by the US administration. In this plan, the continuation of the steps of the two sides in a step-by-step manner could lead to both the resuscitation of the JCPOA and provide the space for bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the remaining issues.

Meanwhile, accepting Iran’s request to receive a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could be another positive step by the US administration