Sasan Karimi
Due to the situation in Washington, and considering the Biden administration policies in the diplomatic arena, some expected the return of the US to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the return to the Paris Climate Agreement, to take place quickly but with appropriate executive orders in the early days. However, as it turns out, the JCPOA has been like a fire for all sides of the game, which requires other equations because of the same sensitivities that prolonged its negotiations. Therefore, the process of this return, which requires not only a signature but also a series of effective measures from the parties, is proceeding slowly and faces many obstacles.
The US government faces various obstacles in effectively returning to the JCPOA and lift the sanctions against Iran:
Domestic politics: Given the political structure of the US and the need by Congress for the approval of many senior individuals in the new administration, as well as the sensitivity of the JCPOA amongst the vast majority of Republicans and some Democrats, the immediate return to the JCPOA and engaging with Iran could pose a real problem for the Biden administration from the outset in verifying the qualifications of individuals. As such, Biden and his first circle have tried to keep the matter suspended until they crossed this path.
Regional politics: It is clear that the two regional partners of the US-Israel and Saudi Arabia-are doing their best to keep Iran in the corner and stop Biden returning to the JCPOA. Admittedly, the new Washington Democrat administration’s treatment of the two partners is a clear example of the growing distance between the US and these two countries. But, in any case, the direct and indirect pressures of these two actors and their lobbies in the US and Europe on the Biden administration cannot be ruled out.
Moreover, political calculations require that Biden, as a professional politician, uses his leverage to some extent. Thus, further contemplation on the lifting of sanctions on Iran not only seems a rational move that helps Biden to justify these possible next steps but could also be a bigger propaganda campaign for him in reaching an agreement with Iran. On the other hand, Iran is trying to both dissuade Biden and his team from any new request to return to the JCPOA and speed them up in lifting the sanctions by increasing Biden’s political costs in this delay and increasing the energy of this system.
Although the second goal has been more or less achieved, the first one has been fully realized as no rumours have been heard of any new conditions proposed by Biden and his team.
However, what can be seen today in Iran and the US as the two main players in the game is that the governments in both countries have somewhat similar conditions; both have sufficient incentive to return to the JCPOA and fulfill their commitments because in addition to formal issues, they consider this agreement to be the achievement of their political line. Meanwhile, both countries face internal obstacles from their opponents regarding the agreement, primarily their political opponents, as both are worried about the fate of the unilateral implementation of the agreement and the reproduction of the issues from the other side that could endanger their domestic politics.
Despite some speculation and pessimism, what has been seen over the past few weeks is the political will of both sides to return to the agreement without any preconditions. Moreover, by considering the actions and positions of both parties, which sometimes has an internal audience and sometimes an external one, their political will can be found more clearly among their sub-actions. In fact, although the US government has taken a lesser stance towards Iran and only spoken for a while about taking a position on fulfilling its obligations, the indirect actions of the new administration in Washington seems to illustrate more than its direct statements. For example, increasing its distance from Israel and prioritizing contact with Netanyahu, which is at the bottom of the list, was not meaningless neither was taking a stand in the Yemeni war by removing the Houthis from the list of terrorists and isolating Saudi Arabia. Avoiding haste on issues such as the Additional Protocol that has arisen in Iran and taking small and more symbolic steps is a better approach, such as withdrawing the failed trigger claim from the UN, the lifting of restrictions on the Iranian delegation in New York and trying to reconcile ways and marginal negotiations, shown with the exchange of prisoners and reducing pressure on debtors to Iran to pay their arrears.
Meanwhile, despite the increased energy of the system, the Iranian government has been able to prevent the escalation of tensions and the ‘demolishing of what has not yet been built’, the most important of which was Iran’s agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to cancel the implementation of the Additional Protocol. This action prevented a sharp increase in Iran’s political spending: “This agreement was a classic example of an important lesson in diplomacy, which is to create an option instead of choosing between the available options.”
In such circumstances, in terms of political planning, the first step is to avoid escalating tensions and the other is that in no way should a consensus be formed between the US, Europe, China and Russia against Iran, which is what happened in the years 2005–2011. For this purpose, in return for the US’s ineffective but politically motivated concessions, as cited symbolic concessions should be offered to the other side to show goodwill and flexibility. The current situation of the JCPOA is similar to an event in the second half of 2015 when the agreement was not yet implemented and negotiations were only held to implement the agreement in January 2016. It seems that, currently, despite the political will of all parties to implement the JCPOA there is more distrust, especially from the Iranian side.
As the principles are the only elements that must not be breached, any possibility and solution that does not contradict the principled positions and the interests of the country are necessary to be used, albeit rationally. It is far from realistic to merely wait for matters to move in a direction that is desirable to Iran and its citizens as this can only make the situation more complicated.
what can be seen today in Iran and the US as the two main players in the game is that the governments in both countries have somewhat similar conditions; both have sufficient incentive to return to the JCPOA