Nosratollah Tajik
I believe that eliminating the effects of the departure of US President, Donald Trump, from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the most important step that the new US administration can take to build trust with Iran. In fact, the lifting of US sanctions against Tehran is part of eliminating the effects of Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, another part of which is related to the damage that has been done to the economy of Iran and its people. As a result, the US’s return to the JCPOA without eliminating the effects of Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement is not only useless but harmful.
For more than forty years after the Islamic revolution the Iranian citizens have suffered greatly due to various US sanctions. However, in recent years, and as a result of Trump’s reckless move to leave the JCPOA, Iran’s economy, as one of the most successful of the region’s economy, has faced severe damage. In particular, the ‘smart’ sanctions were imposed during this period which actually targeted end consumers and ordinary citizens. In many cases, the Americans ‘may’ have been correct that medicines were not legally subject to sanctions. However, while it has not been possible to transfer money within the international financial system to buy medicines or in situations where pharmaceutical companies are afraid of trading with Iran, the Iranian pharmaceutical sector has almost completely been under US sanctions causing Iran great loss and suffering during this period, both financially and economically, as well as humanely and socially. As a result, compensating for these losses is a vital, necessary and important step to rebuild trust in Tehran.
In my opinion, not all of our problems relate to foreign policy and not all of our foreign policy problems relate to the JCPOA, but a part of the problem for Iran and its citizens are domestic obstacles. The occurrences of mismanagement, political issues, the political economy, the excessive dependence on oil, corruption and the decay of the country’s administrative system, which is severely behind the changing conditions of today’s Iranian society, are problems that must be resolved internally.
As a whole, Iran has acted appropriately with regards to the problems that relate back to the JCPOA. Perhaps one of the most notable criticisms over the years about the eleventh and twelfth governments have been that they had laid all their eggs in the foreign policy’s basket, particularly in the case of the JCPOA. Whether the decision to focus on the JCPOA was made with the determination of the government or whether it was a trick, is a matter that needs to be considered separately. What happened in practice was that Iran’s foreign policy was summarized to the JCPOA and no benefit was received from regional relations or bilateral relations with other countries.
Despite the fact that the government had an unbalanced focus on foreign policy, the reality was that, in general, and at least in the area of the JCPOA, the Iranian government had been able to play a good and vigilant role with two of its fundamental strategies in the JCPOA having been effective.
The first is that in the two and a half years since Donald Trump left the JCPOA, Iran has not allowed the US government to engage effectively in consensus against Iran. The Trump administration remained isolated in the wake of the JCPOA’s withdrawal and the US allies refused to side with him. The second strategy was to make it clear to the international community that the JCPOA was acceptable to Iran, as long as it was beneficial to the country and its people. With these strategies, the country was able to move towards overcoming Trump’s threat by January 2021. It must not be forgotten that last year Iran was on the brink of a full-scale war with the US. Whether the downing of a US spy drone in Iran’s skies or the assassination of Iranian and Iraqi commanders in the fight against ISIS, both could have led to war if Iran had wanted to react more strongly. However, on the whole, the Iranian government acted appropriately and intelligently during the Trump era despite all the hardships and sufferings that were caused for the Iranian citizens.
There are now great potentials, both in foreign policy and at home. Domestic issues should certainly be analysed by the experts in this field but, as a foreign policy expert, it appears that the country has great manoeuvring power. One recent example of this power in Iranian foreign policy was the recent enactment of the Iranian parliament, entitled ‘Strategic Action to Lift Sanctions’. While there are those who are close to the government that have been very dissatisfied with the bill, I believe that this enactment was not entirely negative.
Such actions return leverage to Iran that can be utilised in a good way. The government has also used this leverage by coincidence, such as the visit of Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the IAEA in Tehran and the recent move to reach an understanding with the IAEA, which showed that Iran is determined to maintain the JCPOA’s structure and benefit from it.
Iran has reached a good point in the JCPOA’s test and balance. One of the strengths of the performance is that Iran is implementing the parliament’s enactment, suspending its extra-judicial obligations and not allowing relations with the IAEA to deteriorate. During the implementation of the JCPOA, there were fifteen positive reports on the full implementation of the JCPOA’s obligations within the agency. These reports show that Iran is living up to its commitments and the world has realized this too. Recently, the commander of the US force, Centcom, was quoted as saying that Iran intends to be a “desirable player” in the region. If these statements are quoted correctly, it means that Iran, by its actions, has been able to convince its enemies that they cannot ignore its interests in the region.
Iran was born as a regional power and today it is the turn of other countries in the region together with other world powers to recognize this fact. What has made Iran confront and criticize the American performance in recent years has been because Washington does not intend to recognize Iran’s regional power and does not want to give anything to Iran in return. The US’s behaviour of withdrawing from the JCPOA and abruptly stopping the implementation Resolution 2231 was exactly the opposite of the reality occurring on the ground in the region Unfortunately, the Security Council did not react to the non-implementation of its resolution and simply ignored such actions whereas if a developing country had acted in violation of a resolution, instead of the US, it would certainly have been a different story.
So far it appears Iran has played well in the face of American pressure and the country is in a good position. Contrary to some commentators, today’s Iran is not stuck in the ring—it is in a position where it can play well with its competitors.
In its agreement with the IAEA, Iran has implemented the parliamentary resolution as a countermeasure to reduce its obligations and suspend the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, sending a message to the world that Iran does not seek to break all the norms. These rational and conscious actions has shown that Iran intends to be recognized as a responsible actor and appropriately assert its rights.
Hence, due to the structure of Joe Biden’s government, I believe that Iran should try to use its existing capacities for direct interaction as relying on Europe and using the capacities of other countries, such as Qatar or Oman, is no longer effective. Messaging is an issue but attempting to solve the problems with the US, as a superior economic, political and military power in the world is a different matter. Today, Iran has the capacity to take direct engagement into account because, from a national security perspective, it is in its best interest to resolve issues with the US.
Confrontations with the US are reaching a point that is called a ‘descending period’. In economics it is said that to produce a certain amount of capital, a certain level of manpower and raw materials are needed. If the volume of these variables increases significantly, the product does not necessarily increase. This process is called ‘the descending period law’. Presently, the volume of confrontations between the US and Iran is increasing dramatically and inconclusively and, if the country were to continue this approach in the long run, Iran would lag behind its regional rivals. Unfortunately, the umbilical cord of the country’s development model is connected to resolving issues between Iran and the US for whatever reason. As a result, it is necessary for Iran to maintain the JCPOA, as long as it is in the country’s interest, and in order to resolve the issues with the US.
It is fair to say that Iranian citizens have the right to not be optimistic until they feel that the effects of Trump’s departure from the JCPOA has been resolved. If the European invitation for dialogue between the remaining members of the JCPOA and the US is to be formal, Iran should not welcome such dialogue until the effects of the US withdrawal are fully resolved. However, if such a meeting is to be informal, Iran must seize the opportunity to present its legitimate demands to the other side.