Beijing and Moscow: For or Against the JCPOA

Seyyed Hossein Malaek

Being pessimistic about the current course of events, I personally do not consider that what happened on Monday night in Tehran between the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was a natural event. Such pessimism is based on various reasons. Firstly, is the issue of the deadline that the Western parties have taken in response to Iran’s nuclear move. I believe that the Western parties need this deadline to assess what the political situation in Iran will look like on the eve of the Iranian presidential election and who is more likely to take over control in Iran. The second is that Iran’s flexibility in the face of the 23th February deadline is not, in my view, a good sign.
In fact, under an agreement reached Monday night between Iran and the IAEA, intrusive inspections have remained in place and Iran has promised that what is recorded will remain intact for up to three months, although it remains in Iran’s hand. Certainly, this issue is not provided for in the law and there was no prohibition on it, but the point is that the Agency’s oversight, whether in the name of the Additional Protocol or in the name of the Interim Technical Understanding, is ultimately a privilege that has been received by the other party despite the implementation of the parliamentary law. 
On the other hand, the issue of the two non-Western members of the JCPOA is one for which I have little hope. China and Russia are both looking for an opportunity to engage positively with the US so that their relationship with Washington can be taken out of the Trump era. Meanwhile, they want that engagement to be at the expense of a third party, not their own. Although Beijing and Moscow have stated in their declaratory positions that they want to protect Iran’s interests, their own national interest is to have a so-called ‘constructive engagement’ with the US and the Middle East, at the lowest cost which seems to be the most important right now but Iran is the most important problem they have. 
It is expected that they will want to force Iran to enter into a new round of negotiations and, in fact, set a new table for long-term negotiations not in the form of the P5+1, but in a new format with the world powers. News and reports from within the US show that the Biden administration has not yet been able to reach a consensus within the US on the issue of Iran. We have to accept that the JCPOA’s opponents and the critics of Biden in the US government are not very weak and have a lot of power.
If Joe Biden wants to take steps to lift sanctions against Iran and return to the JCPOA’s commitments, he will face widespread resistance in the House, the Senate and influential groups in US politics. That is why the actions that the Biden government has taken so far against Iran are so insignificant. Biden has not yet been able to build a political consensus within the US so that if he was determined to return to the JCPOA, he could do so.
In addition, it should be noted that between thirty-five and forty senior US government officials who need Senate approval are still reportedly in the queue for a vote of confidence. Biden is unwilling to create a bipolarity within Congress over the Iran issue because it may cause problems for the approval of his cabinet. The Biden administration needs an opportunity to implement the decision at the lowest cost and with the most political support if it decides to return to the JCPOA.
The Israelis and the Saudis are pushing Biden to make his position known as soon as possible, as they desperately want the Biden administration to continue on the same path as Donald Trump. In response, Biden has so far made concessions to the demands of lobbying groups and those opposed to the JCPOA, which has kept them somewhat satisfied. However, I doubt that the US government is ready to finalize its position regarding the nuclear deal with Iran after this short period of time.

It is expected that they will want to force Iran to enter into a new round of negotiations and, in fact, set a new table for long-term negotiations not in the form of the P5+1, but in a new format with the world powers