Sarah Massoumi
Iran and the US are facing days of difficult decision-making. While the nuclear deal remains the only orifice for Tehran to lift economic sanctions, it serves as an effective tool for the US to limit and maintain control over Iran’s nuclear activities. Both countries have stated that there is no diplomatic contact between them and, in such circumstances, other remnant parties in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are responsible for any mediation or messaging between Iran and the US. The remnants resorted to various means to preserve the agreement during Donald Trump’s four year administration, so that they could bring the power back to the JCPOA when the new president takes office at the White House.
Since last Wednesday, the Biden administration has finally moved away from purely verbal stances by taking two steps: backing away from activating the trigger mechanism in the UN Security Council and lifting the restrictions on the travel of Iranian diplomats in New York. Various officials of the Biden cabinet regularly update Washington’s stance on the nuclear deal and its relationship with Iran but here, in Tehran, there has been considerable political silence for at least the past forty-eight hours, which seems to be rooted in two issues:
1. Iran was waiting for the visit of Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who arrived in Tehran on Saturday evening to have meetings with the Iranian officials this week.
2. Tehran is determined to implement the resolution of the parliament in suspending the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, but simultaneously, it cannot ignore diplomatic proposals for simple dialogue. Iran has endured four years of Donald Trump’s presidency, under a policy of maximum pressure in all areas and, although the economic pressure on the Iranian citizens in the days of the Coronavirus outbreak cannot be denied, Tehran’s strategic patience, as well as its roadmap for moving towards reducing its JCPOA’s commitments, had two significant achievements for Iran.
Firstly, the image of Iran being a country that has covert military nuclear activities and is unwilling to cooperate with the international community was shattered. Public opinion at the international level witnessed a year of Iran’s patience in the face of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the inability of the survivors to reach an agreement to compensate them for this withdrawal. During this period, numerous reports of the IAEA showed that although Tehran had been deprived of the JCPOA’s economic interests due to violations by the other parties, it had not committed suicide or irreparable harm. It was as a result of this policy that, despite the anti-Iranian atmosphere in the Western media, most analysts over the past four years blamed the US for the crisis in the JCPOA and spoke of the US isolation as a result of its withdrawal.
The second achievement for Iran was maintaining the framework of the agreement for the day that finally came with the end of Trump’s presidency. This goal was best achieved by reducing Iran’s commitments. After a year of strategic patience, the decision of the Board of Supervisors, whose members are from various political and security institutions, was that Iran should respond reciprocally and use the rights defined in the JCPOA. The engineering of these steps was done in such a way that, before and after each step, the other side had enough time to compensate for the past and stop the process started in Tehran.
Meanwhile, Iran managed the quantity and quality of its nuclear activities at each step of the reduction in commitments in such a way as to deter the opportunity for any security threat or claim about Iran’s rapid movement towards arms. Iran’s most important decision was to refrain from changing the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, which was in fact a double-edged sword: on the one hand, the sensitivities of Russia and China were taken into account and, on the other, the three European countries and the IAEA could not claim that the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities had stopped.
It is in the shadow of these two achievements that Iran today is in a difficult decision-making moment that requires a precise and fully calculated game with all the cards at its disposal. Tehran’s insistence on lifting all sanctions imposed by Donald Trump before Iran returns to the JCPOA’s commitments is a legitimate demand, given the evidence of the liabilities of the other parties. At the same time, the return of the alliance to the front of the three European countries present in the JCPOA and the US, as well as the media power of this current to create an atmosphere, has made the work difficult for Iran.
Over the past three days, as different US, French, British and German officials have commented on the ball landing in Iran’s court and for it to be returned to the JCPOA, these countries’ media outlets have led the public opinion that there is room for multilateralism and diplomacy in the JCPOA case; it is Iran that has not responded to the US Secretary of State’s indirect offer to attend a consultative meeting. The other side has not merely limited itself to these political and media constructions but has also provided the prerequisites for accusing Iran technically.
While, Rafael Grossi is heading to Tehran for the second time in six months to meet with Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization, and other Iranian officials to halt the voluntary implementation of the protocol, Reuters has raised a new accusation against Iran. The agency quoted unnamed sources as saying that the IAEA had found uranium particles at two Iranian nuclear sites which it had inspected months before. Although Iran has denied the allegations, it appears that the plot was made on the eve of Grossi’s visit to Tehran with the aim of putting pressure on Iran and gaining concessions. By putting this claim alongside Tehran’s determination to reduce the level of inspections of nuclear facilities, one can see that the other side is trying to raise suspicion of Iran’s nuclear program being on a military path.
Regardless of considering these developments as a political show and an attempt to change the game, or as an inadequate but positive step in reviving the JCPOA, an examination of the reactions of other countries, including Russia and China, to the consultations and stances of the three European countries and the US shows that they have welcomed these stances. Although the JCPOA’s path had slipped as a result of the counterparties’ commitment, Biden’s claim to resort to diplomacy requires calculated political steps by Iran.
Iran can simultaneously carry out its previous threat to halt the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, but, like the other side, can also raise the flag of diplomacy and dialogue. Despite continuing the policy of maximum pressure against Iran for the past thirty days, Joe Biden is considered a different successor to Donald Trump. He has shown maximum recourse to diplomacy in the last three days. In response, Iran can also embrace diplomatic solutions while continuing to pursue a policy of maximum resistance.
Iran can simultaneously carry out its previous threat to halt the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, but, like the other side, can also raise the flag of diplomacy and dialogue