Playing in Extra Time

The US’s Plan to Revive the JCPOA

Kourosh Ahmadi

During the visit of Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to Tehran, the creative solution that was expected was achieved. There is now a three-month opportunity to try to take advantage of the window that seems to be opening up. According to Grossi, the IAEA inspectors will have less access but they can still monitor Iran’s main nuclear sites where the nuclear material is produced. Leaving aside the technical details of this agreement, it is important that it prevents a potential crisis from occurring to the extent that the agency can work within the set parameters and that the Western parties can also be relatively satisfied with it.
More importantly, this ‘constructive ambiguity’ could be part of an effort to pursue a proposal by the EU for informal talks between Iran and the P5+1 to coordinate the steps that Iran and the US must take in order to return to their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The issuance of a joint statement by the US, France, Germany and the UK after the virtual meeting of their foreign ministers on Thursday can be considered the most important event that has happened since the withdrawal of the US from this agreement in May 2017. This statement indicates that there have been some important developments. 
Firstly, the US re-recognizes the JCPOA as a ‘key achievement of multilateral diplomacy’ and, secondly, the US has expressed the plan that was supposed to be formulated after consulting with Congress and its allies, through this joint statement. Thirdly, the statement expresses the consensus of the US and the three European countries on the way forward and their proposal to Iran. 
Although this plan is unfair and, to some extent, seeks to violate the JCPOA in a different way, it requires Tehran to also have a more complex and measured confrontation to it than ever before because, in addition to these four countries, a number of other countries will probably join. What is not yet clear is the reaction of Russia and China, who are under pressure from some countries in the region and also the Biden administration.
The negotiating proposal that followed the EU’s statement and the prompt US agreement, is another part of the proposal. The format designed for these negotiations, which is the informal negotiations between the P4+1 and Iran with the US as an observer or guest, is clearly designed to encourage Iran to agree to it.
The similar negotiations that took place earlier in 2015 to coordinate the necessary steps to implement the JCPOA agreements can facilitate the work. The reaction that Iranian officials have shown to the proposal so far, including Mr Araghchi’s announcement that the possibility of negotiation is being considered, has not at least negated its practicality. The Biden administration’s agreement to the talks comes as extremists in the US accuse the government of ignoring an alleged attack on a US base in Iraq. They believe that such an agreement means to withdraw the US claim that the trigger mechanism is operational and equates to formally approving the lifting of arms embargoes on Iran. 
What can disrupt the game is the apparent insistence of the other side to go beyond the JCPOA’s commitments. The insistence of the mere revival of ‘the old JCPOA’ is not enough and the ‘strengthening of the JCPOA’ means the extension of the restrictions contained in it are beyond the scope of the informal negotiation channel proposed by the EU. More importantly, it is highly unlikely that Tehran will now be willing to negotiate in ‘strengthening the JCPOA’. What Tehran does not accept is to negotiate on Iran’s missile program and regional activities. Tehran’s agreement to such negotiations means agreeing to a new agreement of a fundamentally different nature, of which there is also no indication. 
Of course, it can still be hoped that if technical negotiations begin, either an intermediate solution to the issues will be reached to coordinate the steps, an agreement will be reached, or the parties will agree to postpone such negotiations to a future time. What may have made the job more difficult compared to 2015 is the change in circumstances. The situation in the region and the situation of some regional actors have changed compared to five years ago, particularly the political situation in the US and Iran and the situation in Iran’s nuclear program. If we assume that these developments have had an impact on the quality of the US and European proposals, it is also appropriate for Iran to take these innovative developments in line with its interests.